Astana negotiations and the challenges ahead

Astana negotiations and the challenges ahead
The Moscow Declaration, issued on Dec. 20, constitutes the clearest political background for reading the Astana negotiations, and what follows them in the awaited Geneva IV negotiations. Yet it is more correct to say that the outcomes of Astana are a direct political translation of the understandings between the three guarantor powers in the Moscow Declaration. 

This fact remains unchanged even with the attempts to jump over it, or coming up with out-of-context interpretations. There is a difference, the implications of which need to be recognized, between a sound political perception of what is happening around us and to us, and how to deal with it, whether with rejection or acceptance based on that perception.

It was evident in Astana how keen Russian and Turkish guarantors were to legitimize the Iranian side entering as a third guarantor. This was achieved in the joint trilateral statement, and through not making it conditional to the consent of the opposition and the regime, as long as both parties are free from the consequences of signing and approving it. However, that does not place Turkey and Russia in the same position, and the resulting effect as the side negatively affected by Iran turning into a guarantor to the ceasefire agreement is actually the military delegation of the opposition, which openly declared its reservation about this item contained in the preamble to the joint statement. The question about the possibility of Iran turning from a supporting party of the Assad regime with all its strength into a partner of the regime in ensuring the ceasefire, however, remained a dilemma no one had an answer to. But, on the other hand, no one knows the content of the understandings of the three parties in the phase that will follow Astana, especially in terms of what their respective roles in the project and the details of the next Syrian political solution will be. What seemed ambiguous in this regard puts us in front of a package of data that helps explain the scene to some extent. One of the most important of them is the monopoly of the three forces to draw a road map for the Syrian solution, through the Russian party ensuring a change in its position in a way  that resembles the role of the godfather who is able to open channels between all Syrian sides, and who can remove the veto of the revolution and the opposition powers over its role as a start, and then prepare the negotiation stage for a political solution according to new rules, excluding the Geneva Communiqué of 2012.

Iran recognizes the need to comply with Russia, so as not to dissipate the gains it made on the Syrian land through resisting the Russian perception, both on the ground and in politics. Meanwhile, Iran is betting on passing time for its militias and the forces of the regime to gain total control over the rest of the areas controlled by the opposition factions. As for Turkey, since halting the spread of Kurdish forces on its borders from the west side of the Euphrates became a priority for its national security, it has opted to exercise its influence on the opposition factions so that the latter won’t be a hindrance to its understandings with Russia.This pushes it (Turkey) to secure the presence of those factions in the Astana negotiations, in return for making those factions keen on observing the success of the Turkish efforts to consolidate the ceasefire, given the intensity of the escalation by the forces of the regime and its allies of their military operations in Wadi Barada and other Syrian areas. It is noteworthy that the negotiations between the opposition and the regime in order to reach a political agreement were not on the agenda of the three powers at the Astana negotiations.

The whole point was to deliver a message to the world, signed by Russia, Turkey and Iran, on the joint statement: they are the influential powers capable of forcing a political settlement in Syria, and will not, in the future, accept any American, Arab or European roles that would belittle their power, or set solutions not considerate of their calculations and interests. And arising from this, the disagreements between them, which still stand in a number of areas, would not lessen their joint efforts to formulate a new framework for the settlement, not bound by international points of reference and resolutions, even though the statement mentions some of them, based in the first place on satisfying the geopolitical and economic considerations of each of them. The EU representatives in Astana understood the content of that message, and their uncomfortable expressions towards it didn’t hide their fear of its content and its effect in marginalizing the role of their countries in the “Syrian file”, if the guarantor powers were to succeed in exclusively putting their hands on the “file”.

In a clearer manner, the very fast American response to the Astana negotiations, on the eve of publishing the American plan for safe zones in Syria, meant that the new administration will not accept any solution or track for the Syrian issue, without its own approval and acknowledgment of its role, and also of its ability to reshuffle the cards through stirring fears on the Kurdish matter, especially for Turkey and Iran. In a clearer sense, serious challenges lie before the ability of guarantor states to ensure a mechanism for implementing their understandings in light of political variables that can cause changes of hearts and sides. It might be that delaying the Geneva IV negotiations until the end of February, as the Russian foreign minister declared, is due to the need to test and clarify the American stance before involvement in a political process, the strides of which may be compromised depending on the American and European position.       

The guarantor states in Astana wanted to restrict the negotiations between the regime’s delegation and the opposition to a ceasefire in their own territories. And even the Russian attempt to suggest the idea of establishing a legal body to handle the writing of Syria’s constitution, and preparing for presidential and parliamentary elections, was to test the waters of the opposition’s readiness to negotiate political issues. The opposition  did well when it rejected the idea plainly and clearly, and when it rejected the discussion of a draft constitution submitted by Russian representatives, thus cutting the way for it to become another Syrian opposition platform added to the existing platforms of Moscow, Cairo, Hmeimim and Astana. This is in order not to bear the responsibility of fragmenting political representation of the powers of revolution and opposition, at a time where major challenges facing the Syrian revolution mandate shouldering the national responsibilities of consolidating the unity of the political, military and civilian representation of the revolution powers. Consolidating the unity of these powers is achieved through maintaining the legitimacy and exclusiveness of the High Negotiations Committee in any upcoming negotiations, and holding on to the international points of reference and resolutions, particularly the Geneva Communiqué of 2012, and not compromising or forfeiting them. These are the guarantee to the departure of Bashar al-Assad and his gang, and to enabling Syrians to move toward building a new Syria as a homeland for all Syrians,  not as a “cake” to be cut to pieces between states.

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