The Astana funny paradox

The Astana funny paradox
The focal point of all the efforts exerted by Russia to translate its military adventure in Syria into political gains is achieving a comprehensive truce between the Assad regime − Russia interfered to protect − and the Syrian revolutionaries and opposition it calls “rebels". Due to its closeness to the Syrian revolutionaries and opposition, Turkey was approached and chosen by Russia to be the guarantor of these groups; and Russia assigned itself the guarantor of the other side.

Russia has fully sided and participated with the Assad and Iranian militias in the brutal war against the other side. War crimes were recorded to have been perpetrated by Russia and its two allies.

Paradoxically, the side that is so keen on making Russia succeed in its truce or cease-fire endeavors is the one that suffers most from Russia’s brutality, while the side it came into Syria to rescue (the regime and Iran) is going out of its way to ruin the Russian efforts by breaching the cease-fire agreed upon and signed on the 30th of December 2016.

In breaching previous cease-fires in Syria engineered by the Russians and the Americans, Russia threw the blame on the Americans. This time the Americans were excluded; and this truce is a Russian exclusive effort. Now who should Russia blame for the continuous breaching of the cease-fire? The "rebels" in Russia’s terminology have committed themselves to the cease-fire; Russia has not directed the blame on Iran or the Assad regime, nor has it yet blamed itself for the violations; and it cannot be the ITALIANS who are blocking the Russian "peace" efforts.

Russia has to be just and honest with itself and with the world for once if it wants its aspirations to come true as a world power or super power that can broker peace in a highly complicated affair. 

There are few issues Russia has to seriously address. First, it has to call a spade a spade. Iran and the Assad regime cannot continue to exist on the Syrian arena if the killing in Syria is stopped. A cease-fire in Syria means the end of the Iranian expansionist plan in the Middle East region. The Assad regime is still consistent with its motto of either ruling Syria or destroying it. Their consent to Astana is to gain from it some leverage to continue with their project. They both know that they are in the corner at such a time; if they object to it they are finished. And if they go there, it is not to make the Russian efforts succeed, but to simply fail them.

Russia has also to stop thinking of the Astana meeting as a card from which it gains more power without giving it the impetus it requires to make it a success. And on top of the steps it should take is exposing its allies’ ambitions of ruing its efforts by using Astana to further their gains and projects.

If Russia is to succeed in Astana − when no one but Turkey and the opposition paradoxically want it to succeed − two moves are to be taken; and they are inevitable.

First, Russia needs to make it clear to the Mullahs of Iran that their project in the region cannot go through. The whole world, in particular the people of the region, are against it. Moreover, their betting on Assad is like betting on a dead horse. They should work for a bargain that relatively saves their face, and limit themselves to the present borders of Iran before they become the past borders.

Second (with the Assad regime not requiring from them too much of an effort to abide by the Geneva terms of reference in return for some "redemption", Russia has to work on itself to prove to be a serious player on the world arena. The military might is not automatically translated into a political might. As Russia entered Syria with its military might to support the aggressor against the oppressed, and got away with that; it cannot get away with equal political gains if a real political compromising effort is not seriously exerted into the Astana process. From the Astana process, weak parties may gain (Iran, the regime and the opposition), but a sponsor or a guarantor cannot think of the little weak parties’ gains. Russia could gain the grand prize if it thinks big. And thinking big means the aggressor’s gains should be cut and the aggressed gains should be guaranteed − on top the cease-fire Russia and Turkey are guarantors for, and an honest effort in Geneva for a real political transition in Syria.

This may sound imaginary or wishful thinking, but it is the only way out for Russia, and those surviving because of its power. Hardly any party wants Russia to succeed. Ironically, those Russia harmed most want its “peace” efforts to come to fruition. If Russia wants to succeed in this arena, and lessen world pressure on it in other complicated files, the road is crystal clear.

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