The Syrian opposition arena did not witness such disputes between Arabs and Kurds before this date; all were part of a liberation movement seeking to weed out the comprehensive sectarian despotic regime to build a diverse democratic free country that accommodates everyone.
Since that ominous day, the equation started to change, walls started to grow, dams started to be built, and the bridges started to be destroyed between the two sides in addition to the decrease in the common factors and the diversity in destinations and aims.
Since that ominous day, the PYD became a ruining factor in the national relations and perpetrated practices that demolished all possibilities of connections between Arabs and Kurds which made the relation reach an unprecedented level of deterioration at the national level.
The announcement of the auto administration that day would not have been a problem had it been ‘clean’. Many Syrian cities formed their local councils but soon it was clear that what the PYD aimed at was a different thing. It decided to form a special parliament, put laws and a constitution; it appointed ministers and later declared a Kurdish federation which was not approved by Arabs and even a significant part of the Kurds.
Such practices are no more than the top of the iceberg. There is much more to be mentioned. Before this, the PYD formed a military militia of a new national kind and added to it some others for camouflage at the time the Syrian opposition used to negate any sectarian or national nature for the revolution. Three months later, Assad forces withdrew voluntarily from many areas and delivered them to the PYD to add doubt and suspicion.
The PYD refused partnership with any political current in the opposition and disappointed even the coordinating committee, its only ally in the Syrian opposition after benefiting from it to classify itself as one of the opposition currents. The PYD also rejected partnership with the other Kurdish parties, distanced itself from them, imprisoned some of their leaders, expelled and exiled others and launched campaigns to arrest their adherents. This made many leave the area and immigrate.
Since that ominous day, the PYD and its auto administration, and later its ministries and federations, issued many ‘despotic’ decisions. It required a Kurdish sponsor for every Syrian who wanted to enter its areas and obliged schools to teach Arab, Syriac and Armenian students in Kurdish. It also issued an ‘Assad’ decision to confiscate possessions, real estates and money of those who left the area, invested them to serve its own case. It cancelled the Syrian flag, both the regime’s and the opposition’s, and poised Kurdish flags whose colors and implications are not known to the Syrians.
Since that ominous day, the PYD started the journey of changing the names of Syrian villages, towns and cities be they of the Kurdish majority or Arab majority and gave them Kurdish names. Its media outlets started fabricating historic data to suggest a Kurdish nature of these cities in a compulsory Kurdishizing process to obsolete the identity.
After the PYD controlled Ain al-Arab (Kobani) and started its colonial expansion, a large displacement move and crimes perpetrated by its armed militias aiming at evacuating villages to annex them to its auto administration were voiced out. These charges were not uttered by Arabs only but also by Assyrians, Syriacs and the Turkmens as well.
Since that ominous day, the PYD started controlling the economy of north Syria. It controlled some oil wells and their revenues went to its fisc or more correctly to the chief’s pocket. The PYD then dominated the agricultural crops and sold them in an area that possesses more than half of Syria’s agricultural and underground wealth without any Kurdish voice to inquire where such money went.
Since that day, the party started to fluctuate between supporters; it cooperated with the regime and received weapons from it; it cooperated with Hezbollah militias near Nubbul and al-Zahra’; it cooperated with the Iranians (from under the table); it allied with the Russians and received exceptional military and political support then overturned them to cooperate with the US; it refused to cooperate with the Free Syrian Army and with other Kurdish factions and convinced its loyalists that the revolution is not theirs because it did not give them any warranties. The PYD knows that no revolution can provide any warranties to anyone but it is a changing process to lay the foundations of a new country.
The PYD monopolized weapons, authority and judiciary and did not accept sharing. It brought fighters from western Qandeel Mountains to deal with the Kurds who are the owners of the land as foreigners. It declared the compulsory conscription in all areas under its control. It evacuated the areas from the youths and displaced them. Its practices were an example of national extremism, a sample of political short-sightedness and a copy that is not different from the comprehensive despotic dictator regime.
Since that ominous day, the PYD started promoting the promised Kurdish state maps that begins in India and ends in al-Sind and takes all Syria’s north till the Mediterranean Sea. All this was capped with the idea that its federation would be politically decentralized; i.e., it wanted a unique policy and its exterior relations are independents from the center in a way that is similar to disunity.
The PYD offended the just case of Syrian Kurds more than it benefited it. It changed the case of Kurds citizens who have rights in every span in Syria to a blind national extremist case overrun by time, similar to Arab nationalism and the sectarian state or doctrine regimes.
Events prove that minorities and nationalities cannot build institutions. How can they build stable countries? Therefore, there is a chance before the Syrian Kurds to revolt against their own "Assad" and his party, to be in good terms with their Arab incubator not to fight against it and to work together to weed out the regime and this party in one go to maintain a healthy intact country for everyone.
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